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The End-of-Semester Effect Fallacy: Some Thoughts on Many Labs 3

The Many Labs enterprise is on a roll. This week, a manuscript reporting Many Labs 3  materialized on the already invaluable Open Science Framework. The manuscript reports a large-scale investigation, involving 20 American and Canadian research teams, into the “end-of-semester effect.” The lore among researchers is that subjects run at the end of the semester provide useless data. Effects that are found at the beginning of the semester somehow disappear or become smaller at the end. Often this is attributed to the notion that less-motivated/less-intelligent students procrastinate and postpone participation in experiments until the very last moment. Many Labs 3 notes that there is very little empirical evidence pertaining to the end-of-semester effect. To address this shortcoming in the literature, Many Labs 3 set out to conduct 10 replications of known effects to examine the end-of-semester effect. Each experiment was performed twice by each of the 20 participating teams...

Can we Live without Inferential Statistics?

The journal Basic and Applied Social Psychology  ( BASP ) has taken a resolute and bold step. A  recent editorial  announces that it has banned the reporting of inferential statistics. F -values, t -values, p -values and the like have all been declared personae non gratae. And so have confidence intervals. Bayes factors are not exactly banned but aren’t welcomed with open arms either; they are eyed with suspicion, like a mysterious traveler in a tavern. There is a vigorous debate in the scientific literature and in the social media about the pros and cons of Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST), confidence intervals, and Bayesian statistics ( making researchers in some frontier towns quite nervous ). The editors at BASP  have seen enough of this debate and have decided to do away with inferential statistics altogether. Sure, you're allowed to submit a manuscript that’s loaded with p -values and statements about significance or the lack thereof, but...

The Dripping Stone Fallacy: Confirmation Bias in the Roman Empire and Beyond

What to do when the crops are failing because of a drought? Why , we persuade the Gods to send rain of course! I'll let the fourth Roman Emperor, Claudius, explain: Derek Jacobi stuttering away as  Claudius in the TV  series I Claudius There is a black stone called the Dripping Stone, captured originally from the Etruscans and stored in a temple of Mars outside the city. We go in solemn procession and fetch it within the walls, where we pour water on it, singing incantations and sacrificing. Rain always follows--unless there has been a slight mistake in the ritual, as is frequently the case.*                                                                  It sounds an awful lot as if Claudius is weighing in on the replication debate, coming down squarely on the side of replication critics, resear...

When Replicating Stapel is not an Exercise in Futility

Over 50 of Diederik Stapel’s papers have been retracted because of fraud. This means that his “findings,” have now ceased to exist in the literature. But what does this mean for his hypotheses?* Does the fact that Stapel has committed fraud count as evidence against his hypotheses? Our first inclination is perhaps to think yes. In theory, it is possible that Stapel ran a number of studies, never obtained the predicted results, and then decided to take matters into his own hands and tweak a few numbers here and there. If there were evidence of a suppressed string of null results, then yes, this would certainly count as evidence against the hypothesis; it would probably be a waste of time and effort to try to “replicate” the “finding.” Because the finding is not a real finding, the replication is not a real replication. However, by all accounts (including Stapel’s own), once he got going, Stapel didn’t bother to run the actual experiment. He just made up all the data. This me...

ROCing the Boat: When Replication Hurts

Though failure to replicate presents a serious problem, even highly-replicable  results may be consistently and dramatically misinterpreted if dependent measures are not carefully chosen. This sentence comes from a new paper by Caren Rotello, Evan Heit, and Chad DubĂ© to be published in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review.   Replication hurts in such cases because it reinforces artifactual results. Rotello and colleagues marshal support for this claim from four disparate domains: eyewitness memory, deductive reasoning, social psychology, and studies of child welfare. In each of these domains researchers make the same mistake by using the same wrong dependent measure. Common across these domains is that subjects have to make detection judgments: was something present or was it not present? For example, subjects in eyewitness memory experiments decide whether or not the suspect is in a lineup. There are four possibilities.             ...